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operator duty to encompass an obligation to engage in enhanced
recovery could result in an impractical requirement unsuited to the
times, thereby hindering national efforts to foster exploration and
development in various areas. 4 "It would seem, when all factors are
considered together, that implied covenants no longer embody a cor-
rect approach to the problem of oil and gas leases." 5 Perhaps the
courts should reexamine the entire concept of the prudent operator
duty before extending it further.
Cynthia M. Frazier
CONSTITUTIONAL COLLISION COURSE:
FAMILY AUTONOMY AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORS
IN VOLUNTARY COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS
Appellees, teenage boys' under the age of fourteen, each of
whom had been institutionalized in Georgia mental hospitals for at
least five years, alleged in a class action that Georgia's provisions
for voluntary' commitment by parent or guardian constituted a
deprivation of the liberty of all persons under the age of eighteen
held for observation and diagnosis or detained for care and treat-
ment at any facility within the state.' The District Court for the
64. Martin, supra note 6, at 208-09.
65. Gibbens, supra note 8, at 341-42, quoting Kyle, Conservation of Oil and Gas,
Kansas 1937-1948, in CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS 149 (1949).
1. At the time the action was brought in the district court, J.R. was thirteen
years old and J.L. was twelve. J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112, 136-39 (M.D. Ga.
1976). Pending review by the Supreme Court, J.L. died; notwithstanding his death, the
Court considered his claim because it formed the basis of the district court's decision.
Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493, 2496 n.1 (1979).
2. Although the admission procedures whereby a minor patient is admitted by
his parents are considered to be voluntary, in fact the children are, with few excep-
tions, unable to secure their own release. Voluntarily committed patients often enter
the hospital under pressure of involuntary confinement and may be held there against
their will for the statutory period, during which time they may be converted to invol-
untary status. Ellis, Volunteering Children. Parental Commitment of Minors to Men-
tal Institutions, 62 CAL. L. REV. 840, 846 (1974). See also T. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY AND
PSYCHIATRY 40 & 83 (1963).
3. The class action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person under the. jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
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Middle District of Georgia overturned the entire state statutory
scheme' providing for civil commitment of minors on the twin bases
of substantive and procedural inadequacies.' Upon review the
Supreme Court acknowledged that the Georgia provisions presented
the potential for erroneous or arbitrary institutionalization, but held
that the fourteenth amendment's due process clause does not re-
quire that minors in commitment proceedings be afforded the oppor-
tunity to present their cases in adversary hearings. Parham v. J.R.,
99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979).
In recent years American courts have recognized a host of
claims asserting the rights of minors.' To many observers 7 this
expansion of juvenile rights has been an affirmation of the United
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other pro-
per proceeding for redress.
4. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 88.503.1 to .3 (1969). Section 88.503.1 provides:
Authority to receive voluntary patients:
(a) The superintendent of any facility may receive for observation and diagnosis
any individual 18 years of age, or older, making application therefor, any in-
dividual under 18 years of age for whom such application is made by his parent or
guardian and any person legally adjudged to be incompetent for whom such ap-
plication is made by his guardian. If found to show evidence of mental illness and
to be suitable for treatment, such person may be given care and treatment at
such facility and such person may be detained by such facility for such period and
under such conditions as may be authorized by law.
(b) The superintendent of any evaluating facility may receive for observation
and diagnosis any individual 14 years of age or older who makes application
therefor. If such individual is under 18 years of age, his parent or guardian may
apply for his discharge and the superintendent shall release the patient within
five days of such application for discharge.
5. J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112, 136-38 (M.D. Ga. 1976).
6. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (corporal punishment of
school children implicates constitutionally protected liberty interest); Planned Parent-
hood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (rights of minors to obtain abortion without paren-
tal consent); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (double jeopardy clause prohibits pro-
secution of juveniles as adults after finding of guilt in juvenile court); Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565 (1975) (minors have protected property interests); Tinker v. Des Moines
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (first amendment entitles school children to wear black
armbands to school as protest to involvement in Vietnam War); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967) (minors facing criminal prosecution entitled to full procedural protection);
Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 431
U.S. 119 (1977), reaffirmed in further proceedings sub nom. Institutionalized Juveniles
v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 459 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Pa. 1978), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 2523
(1979) (juveniles in civil commitment proceedings entitled to procedural safeguards
commonly associated with criminal proceedings).
7. See, e.g., Hoffman, The "Due Process" Rights of Minors in Mental Hospitals,
13 U. S.F. L. REV. 63, 69 (1978); Slovenko, Criminal Justice Procedures in Civil Com-
mitment, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 24 (1977); Comment, Parents, Children, and the Institu-
tionalization Process-A Constitutional Analysis 83 DICK. L. REV. 261, 279 (1979).
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States Supreme Court's 1967 ruling in the case of In re Gault,8
which held that juveniles are entitled to full procedural protection
when criminal proceedings against them might result in an order of
delinquency and commitment to a state mental institution.' Perhaps
of equal importance to any analysis of the constitutionally protected
rights of minors is what the Court did not decide in Gault. Because
it was not at issue, that Court did not consider the potential conflict
of interests between parent and child or the concomitant necessity
of erecting procedural barriers against the ill effects of parental
discretion and decisionmaking. ° Despite this limitation on the scope
of the holding, Gault did firmly establish for the first time that
children are entitled to certain constitutional protections.
Before Gault the progress of children's civil rights was largely
an outgrowth of the law's recognition of family autonomy and paren-
tal authority. Beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska," the Supreme
Court found the due process clause to include the rights "to
establish a home and bring up children."'2 Two years later in Pierce
v. Society of Sisters,'3 the Court relied upon the doctrine of Meyer
when considering a challenge to a state law requiring every parent
or custodian of children under the age of sixteen to send their
children to state-operated schools."' In sustaining the challenge, it
noted that primary responsibility to raise children does not lie with
the state; rather, the Constitution recognizes that parents have
supreme authority in that realm and that they are to be free from
unreasonable state interference. 5
After Gault defined certain limited rights of juvenile consti-
tuents of the family, the Supreme Court continued to develop the
8. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The Gault Court was concerned specifically with proceedings
which might result in incarceration of a minor child accused of crime. The procedural
safeguards provided there were those already required in criminal proceedings for
adults. There is some concern that these procedures are inapplicable to civil commit-
ment proceedings inasmuch as the certainty typical of criminal proceedings is absent
in psychiatric diagnosis. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
9. 387 U.S. at 27-28.
.10. In Gault the Court considered the individual procedural rights to the child to
be for the benefit of the parents as representatives of the child, as well as for the
child.
11. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In Meyer the Court addressed a state regulation which
forbade teaching any modern language in elementary schools. Stressing the authority
of parents over children and the propriety of leaving educational decisions to them, the
Supreme Court found the statute violative of the due process clause.
12. Id at 399.
13. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
14. Id. at 534-35.
15. Id.
1980]
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notion of family autonomy,"6 particularly in cases in which the
"parent[s'] claim to authority in [their] own household and in the
rearing of [their] children"' "? had been set against "the interests of
society to protect the welfare of children and the state's assertion of
authority to that end." 8 In Wisconsin v. Yoder 9 the Court affirmed
the authority of parents to make critical religious and educational
determinations for their children. Amish parents sought freedom to
secure alternative forms of education for their children of high
school age because the values imparted in state-supported public
schools were in variance with Amish values and the Amish way of
life. Relying upon Meyer and Pierce, the Court acknowledged the
overriding importance of the right of parents to provide "equivalent
education"20 in a privately operated system.
More recently in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,' the Court
took the occasion to sum up the progress of its own protection of
family rights and the balance of interests to be established in con-
sidering challenges by the state to parental authority. Members of a
non-nuclear family questioned the validity of a city ordinance which
prohibited their maintenance of a common household. Citing the
ancient right of any association of family members to live together
and the important role of the family in Western tradition, the Moore
Court concluded that the state's authority to dictate the result of a
decision which rests with family members was severely limited."
Thus the Cleveland regulation was stricken as violative of the due
process clause.
The Supreme Court has tempered its protection of family rights
with recognition of the authority of governments to intercede
between family and child for the protection of the child. This protec-
tive attitude is evidenced by Prince v. Massachusetts" and Ginsberg
v. New York,24 both indicating that, while the family interest in rear-
ing children is strong, it is to be balanced against general state
police powers. In Prince the guardian of a minor child was convicted
of the violation of a state child labor law forbidding minors to sell
religious or other literature. Both the minor and her aunt were prac-
16. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
17.. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
18. Id.
19. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
20. Id. at 213.
21. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
22. Id at 503.
23. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
24. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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ticing members of Jehovah's Witnesses. Rejecting a claim of
religious liberty as a limitation on the power of the state, the Prince
majority upheld the adult's criminal conviction and the state's
authority to protect children from adult activities posing threats to
public order.25 At issue in Ginsberg was the validity of a New York
law prohibiting the sale of obscene28 literature to persons under the
age of seventeen. The finding that the magazines in question could
not be characterized as obscene for purposes of adult perusal or pur-
chase provided the opportunity to expand upon the principle
announced in Prince that "the power of the state to control the con-
duct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over
adults."27 The Ginsberg Court placed no specific limitations on the
power of the state to regulate conduct it reasonably finds harmful to
the morals of children. Consequently, this case represents the
Supreme Court's most expansive statement on state authority in
matters previously thought to concern only the family.
Despite its rather broad statements in Ginsberg, the Court has
shown increased willingness to expand the parameters of what
might be termed a "family civil right," but has not taken similar
steps to provide for instances in which the powerful institutional
rights of the family compete with the less developed rights of its
minor members.2 8 Such cases may arise either when a mature child
asserts his authority to make his own decisions irrespective of the
wishes of his parents, or when a family is incompetent or disinclined
to protect the interests of an immature minor member.
One of the earliest statements dealing with the possibility that
the interests of parent and child might diverge or conflict was the
dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in Yoder." He took is'sue with
the majority's analysis of the matter as being within "the dispensa-
tion of parents alone." 0 Reflecting on the history of the Court's
treatment of family matters, he noted that in the past the Court had
analyzed similar conflicts between parents and the state with little
25. 321 U.S. at 168-70.
26. The characterization of the literature in question as "obscene" obviated the
need to consider Ginsberg's first amendment rights. The finding of obscenity applied
only to juveniles, the Court having ruled that the magazines were not obscene for
adults. 390 U.S. at 634-35.
27. Id. at 638, citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. at 170.
28. Recognizing the potential for conflicting interests, the Yoder majority stated
that its holding "in no way determines the proper resolution of possible competing
interests of parents, children and the State in an appropriate state court proceeding in
which the power of the State is asserted on the theory that Amish parents are
preventing their minor children from attending high school." 406 U.S. at 231.
29. 406 U.S. at 241 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
30. Id.
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regard for the interests or rights of children.8 ' He nevertheless insis-
ted that if a child is mature enough to articulate his own choices it
would be a violation of his constitutional rights to proceed without
canvassing those views.2
Recently, the Court faced situations in which mature children
asserted their singular rights to make critical decisions relative to
their future. In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth33 and Bellotti v.
Baird,34 the Court settled those abortion-related conflicts in favor of
the child by denying to parents "absolute power""5 to overrule a
decision to obtain an abortion made by a minor and her physician.
Reasoning that veto power over that determination is not likely to
enhance parental authority or control because the parents and child
are already so fundamentally in conflict, the Danforth Court subor-
dinated the parents' independent interest in preventing an abortion
to the more weighty right of privacy of the competent minor mature
enough to have become pregnant."
Last term in Baird, the Court again considered the accommoda-
tion of interests in cases in which a minor daughter asserts a right
to obtain an abortion against the wishes of her parents. The
challenged state law required unmarried minors desiring abortions
to secure the consent of one or both parents, or in the event of
parental refusal, the ruling of a superior court judge.37 Significantly,
the majority opinion reviewed the principles established in Gault8
and the now familiar statement that the Constitution does not pro-
tect only adults. The magnitude of children's rights and their
equivalence to the rights of adults, however, required a more
exhaustive analysis.
In identifying the peculiar vulnerability of children, their inabil-
ity to make critical decisions in a mature and competent manner,
and the importance of the parental role in child rearing39 as reasons
31. Id. at 243.
32. Id.
33. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
34. 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979). Baird was decided only two weeks after the instant case.
35. Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. at 3048; Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
at 75.
36. 428 U.S. at 75.
37. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12(P) (1974). This section provides that a
daughter under the age of eighteen who has not married must first obtain the permis-
sion of one or both parents before securing an abortion. In the event parental consent
is refused, the child may seek a hearing before a superior court judge. By the terms of
the statute, a minor is not authorized to seek judicial intervention until such refusal is
expressed by her parent(s).
38. See note 8, 8upra.
39. 99 S. Ct. at 3043.
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why the constitutional rights of children may not be equated with
those of adults, Baird established flexible guidelines for resolution of
future intra-family disputes, whether abortion-related or not. In that
case the characterization of the competent minors' rights as
somewhat less comprehensive than those of similarly-situated adults
did not mandate a holding inconsistent with the earlier decision in
Danforth. Rather, the holding in Baird reaffirmed that parental con-
sent may not operate as an absolute or arbitrary veto over a minor's
decision to obtain an abortion, and required that in instances in
which the state chooses to condition exercise of the minor's right on
parental consent, it must also provide alternative procedures by
which the minor has an opportunity to show that she has, attained
maturity sufficient to enable her to make that decision independent
of the wishes of either her parents or the officers of the state."
The apparent victories for children's rights in Danforth and
Baird notwithstanding, on balance the Court's protection of family
interests and rights has been consistent and continuous. It is
generally well-accepted that certain rights associated with the fam-
ily are sheltered by the due process clause. Equally well-accepted is
that often these rights relate to child-bearing and rearing. Any
encroachment upon the further development of the family civil right
first recognized in Meyer and Pierce is tempered by the great
emphasis that Danforth and Baird placed on the age and maturity"'
of the child requesting authority to obtain an abortion. 2
A more troublesome point of departure from the balance of
interests set forth above is the situation in which an incompetent
and/or immature child asserts a right of similar scope. This situa-
40. Id. at 3048.
41. The Danforth Court emphasized that its holding did not suggest that all
minors, without regard to age or maturity, may give effective consent to terminate
pregnancy. Although the recent ruling in Baird is an indication that these factors con-
tinue to be critical in abortion-related and other cases debating possible expansion of
juvenile rights, that decision represents at least some authority for the proposition
that even incompetent children desiring abortions may be able to thwart the wishes of
their parents and the courts. The Baird Court stated in its conclusion that even though
a minor has failed to convince the court that she is competent to make an independent
decision, she nonetheless 'must be permitted to show that an abortion would be in her
best interest. Id. at 3050.
42. Although the impact of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), is not to be
underestimated, the argument made in this note is that it is the unique combination of
the pregnancy and minority factors which produced the results in Danforth and Baird.
Support for this proposition is found in Baird, wherein the majority noted that the
serious dilemma facing a pregnant woman is not mitigated by the fact of her minority.
The Court added that "considering her probable education, employment skills, financial
resources, and emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally
burdensome for a minor." 99 S. Ct. at 3048 (emphasis added).
1980] 991,
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tion, in which the accommodation of the rights and interests of
parent, child, and state is marked by tensions of a dimension not
presented in Danforth or Baird, provides the setting for the instant
case.
Representatives of the class of institutionalized minors in J.R.
challenged the validity of Georgia's voluntary commitment scheme
which provided for admission upon request of parent or guardian
and a finding by the superintendent of the facility that the child was
in need of treatment. 3 At the time suit was filed, Georgia's Mental
Health Director had published no guidelines establishing specific
commitment procedures on a statewide basis." Upon these facts, the
district court enjoined further implementation of the state laws
until such time as they were amended to provide for "at least the
right after notice to be heard before an impartial tribunal."' 5
The J.R. Court defined the proper balance of interests as one
which takes into account the child's interest in avoiding arbitrary
confinement, the parents' interests in the welfare of the child and
family autonomy, and the state's interest in maintaining procedures
it has selected for commitment and treatment of voluntarily admit-
ted patients.'" The majority easily established that a child has a
substantial liberty interest in escaping unnecessary or arbitrary con-
finement." Furthermore, it recognized that there may be instances
of "railroading" juveniles into mental institutions, thus mandating a
check on parental discretion and decisionmaking."
Appellees suggested, and the district court had held, that the
instances in which parents could not be expected or trusted to act in
a child's best interests were sufficiently numerous to create a legal
presumption that unreviewed parental decisionmaking posed a
serious threat to the liberty interests of the minor children."9 To
guard against the ill effects of discretionary parental abuse, the
43. See note 4, supra.
44. 99 S. Ct. at 2498.
45. Id. at 2501, citing J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. at 137.
46. 99 S. Ct. at 2503.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2501. The district court emphasized the testimony of one witness who
stated that some in the community look upon mental institutions as "dumping
grounds" for unwanted children. 412 F. Supp. at 138. Apparently that court relied
upon this testimony in finding a presumption that parents cannot be trusted to act in
the best interests of disturbed minor children. The Supreme Court summarily dis-
missed the witness's assertion of ill-motivation, noting that his statement did not refer
to parents. Rather, the Court found, the witness opined that some child welfare agen-
cies and personnel and juvenile court judges abused the availability of state-operated
mental hospitals. 99 S. Ct. at 2501 n.8.
49. 99 S. Ct. at 2504.
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district court required that a formal adversary hearing be held prior
to commitment, thereby interposing counsel and the adversary pro-
cess between parent and child .5 The Supreme Court rejected this
proposed elevation of parental abuse to the level of a legal presump-
tion, stating that the "notion that governmental power should
supersede parental authority in all cases because some parents
abuse and neglect children is repugnant to American tradition.'
'
Essentially the Supreme Court found that the risks inherent in
parental decisionmaking do not necessarily mandate the transfer of
that power to an alternate agency (in this case, the state courts).
Furthermore, the Court forcefully denied the existence of an
adverse relation between parent and child as a matter of law.2 It
reiterated that the law's concept of that relation rests on a presump-
tion of good will; historically, the law has recognized that "natural
bonds of affection"" tie parent and child and lead parents to act in
the best interests of their children. Despite appellants' argument to
the contrary, the weight of history and tradition prevented the
implementation of what the Court considered an "unnatural"
presumption.
The Court then explored the adequacy of existing pre-admission
standards. The need for a neutral fact-finding agency to ensure the
satisfaction of these requirements focused initially on the role of
psychiatric diagnosis and treatment. Although acknowledging the
inadequacies of psychiatric diagnosis, the Court reaffirmed the belief
that medical determinations are best made by medically-trained per-
sonnel.5 The majority remained unpersuaded that due process
requires a law-trained judicial or administrative officer to make all
findings of fact in all instances, or that deciding physicians must con-
duct formal or quasi-formal hearings before the conclusion of com-
50. 412 F. Supp. at 136-39.
51. 99 S. Ct. at 2504 (emphasis in original).
52. Id. Significant are the majority's citations to Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder. As
was noted in the text at notes 11-20, supra, these cases represent the core of interests
which mark the boundaries of what is here termed a "family civil right."
53. 99 S. Ct. at 2504.
54. Id. at 2507. For analyses of problems associated with medical diagnosis and
treatment, see generally Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Exper-
tise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. Le. REV. 693 (1974); Hoffman, supra note
7. For a history of medical involvement in commitment proceedings, see Ellis, supra
note 2, at 843-46. Ennis and Litwack examined the competency and reliability of
psychiatric experts in civil commitment proceedings. After a thorough analysis, they
concluded that, because of inadequacies peculiar to diagnostic methods, there is no
evidence that psychiatric opinions and terminology aid the courts in making critical
legal determinations in such proceedings. Ennis & Litwack, supra, at 699-720.
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mitment proceedings against a minor.15 Instead, they found that due
process must be flexible56 in responding to the needs of diversified
individuals, and concluded that the requisite flexibility was decid-
edly absent from the formal adversary setting envisioned by the
lower court.
This insistence on a "flexible" concept of due process led to the
subsequent rejection of adversary intervention and judicial control
as checks on arbitrary decisionmaking by parents. The J.R. Court
recognized that neither state nor federal courts are equipped to deal
adequately with such delicate decisions; additionally, it pointed out
that the efforts of advocates representing the opposing interests of
parent and child tend to pit family members against one another,
thereby exacerbating already existing problems. 7
Whether or not the courts are competent to hear such disputes,
it seems certain that adversary presence in highly formalized pro-
ceedings, such as those proposed by the lower court, creates at least
as many problems as it attempts to solve. Considering the role of
counsel in juvenile and other commitment settings, commentators
have urged that often (1) counsel are no better equipped to articu-
late the child's interests or suggest alternative methods of treat-
ment than the child himself;5 (2) counsel are confused about their
role in the proceedings and suffer from feelings of divided loyalty
which do not pose problems in criminal juvenile proceedings;5 (3)
counsel, recognizing their own inability to make and present medical
55. Relative to the proper role of medical experts, the JR. Court stated:
The mode and procedure of medical diagnostic procedures is not the business of
judges. What is best for a child is an individual medical decision that must be left
to the judgment of physicians in each case. We do no more than emphasize that
the decision should represent an independent judgment of what the child requires
and that all sources of information that are traditionally relied on by physicians
and behavioral specialists should be consulted.
99 S. Ct. at 2507.
56. The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394
(1914). At the same time, due process has never been thought to require that the trier
of fact in every case be a legally-trained technician. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
481 (1972). Since Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Court has built upon this
notion of "flexible" due process, thereby reducing the number of instances in which a
full-blown evidentiary hearing is required by the Constitution.
57. 99 S. Ct. at 2508.
58. E.g., Litwack, The Role of Counsel in Civil Commitment Proceedings: Emerg-
ing Problems, 62 CAL. L. REV. 816, 830-31 (1974).
59. E.g., id. at 826-29. Litwack expressed concern over the tendency of counsel to
view their function as that of "merely guarding the procedural rights of the patient,"
and their subsequent hesitation to become totally involved in individual cases. Id at
831.
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determinations and judgments, feel constrained to acquiesce in the
findings of psychiatrists and other medically-trained personnel."0
Perhaps none of these problems presents an insurmountable bar-
rier to the effective use of legally-trained spokesmen for children
and/or incompetents. In fact, the J.R. Court carefully -avoided
language containing that implication and made no attempt to rule
out the possibility of introducing modified procedural safeguards in
commitment hearings. Seemingly, such a possibility inheres in the
concept of "flexible" due process. A ruling to this effect, however,
was not forthcoming, indicating the Court's hesitation to extend the
boundaries of procedural due process. This uncertainty over the effi-
cacy or wisdom of increased judicial and adversary participation in
civil and administrative proceedings,"' coupled with the known
advantages and limitations of administrative procedures which place
decisionmaking authority in the hands of technical and medical per-
sonnel, tilted the Court in favor of retaining the existing pre-
admission standards for voluntarily committed juveniles.
Relying upon a preference for determinations by medical person-
nel, the rejection of a legal presumption of parental bad faith, and
the shortcomings of adversary intervention and judicial control, the
Supreme Court upheld both the Georgia provisions" and the Penn-
sylvania scheme for commitment of minors in a companion case,
Secretary of Public Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles.3 At first
60. E.g., id. at 830. See also Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Com-
mitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 TEx. L. REV. 424, 437 & 460-66 (1966); MacDougall,
Children and the Law: The Limited Effectiveness of Legal Process, in THE CHILD AND
THE COURTS 185 (1978).
61. See, e.g., New Motor Vehicle Bd. of California v. Orrin Fox, Co., 439 U.S. 96
(1978) (California Auto Franchise Act which does not require hearings on merits in pro-
tests upheld); Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (New York's procedure for involun-
tary removal of foster children validated); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977) (Illinois
driver licensing law which allows revocation or suspension without preliminary hearing
upheld); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (Social Security Administration
regulation terminating benefits without evidentiary hearing upheld); Cafeteria and
Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) (United States Navy regulation
permitting summary expulsion of cook without hearing found not to be violative of due
process).
62. See note 4, supra.
63. 99 S. Ct. 2523 (1979). Employing the standard set forth in J.R., the Court in
Institutionalized Juveniles examined the specifics of recently amended Pennsylvania
statutes which grant the rights of adult patients to mentally disturbed or retarded
children over the age of fourteen, but reserve to parents, guardians, or others acting
in loco parentis, authority to commit minors under that age after an independent
medical examination. A three-judge district court panel had ruled that the statutory
scheme, as amended, afforded inadequate protection of the interests of children under
the age of fourteen. Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 459 F.
Supp. 30 (E.D. Pa. 1978). In so holding the district court reaffirmed its 1975 order in
1980]
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glance, these rulings represent a setback for the embryonic move-
ment of children's rights" and a signal from the Court that expan-
sion upon the principles espoused in Danforth is to be reserved for
another day. Significantly, the J.R. Court made only a minor
attempt to reconcile its holding with that of Danforth on the ground
that in cases of voluntary commitment, parents "in no sense have an
absolute right to commit their children to state mental hospitals." 5
The characterization of the issue in terms of "absolute rights" is not
only misleading, but insufficient to answer the dissent's charge that
because, in the instant case, a break in family autonomy had
occurred prior to the proposed interposition of advocates and judge,
any interest in preserving the integrity of the family structure was
greatly reduced.
It is submitted that a more informative definition of the rights
at issue is that based on the maturity and competency of the
children in question. Seen in this light, the more recent ruling in
Baird7 illuminates the Court's concern that exercise of constitu-
tional rights vest only in those children capable of informed deci-
sionmaking. As to this group, the Baird Court indicated that their
rights, although not of the same magnitude as those of adults,, con-
tinue to be recognized. With respect to the class of children
Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), and concluded that before a
child may be voluntarily committed to a state mental hospital or other state facility, he
is entitled to a probable cause hearing within seventy-two hours of the initial deten-
tion', a post-commitment hearing within two weeks of the initial detention, the right to
notice of the existence and nature of pending proceedings, the assistance of counsel at
all significant stages of the commitment process, a finding of the need for hospitaliza-
tion or other treatment by clear and convincing evidence, and the rights of confronta-
tion, cross-examination, and presentation of evidence. Id at 1053. Relying upon the ra-
tionale formulated in JR., the Supreme Court rejected what it considered to be "an
overdose" of due process, and reversed and remanded to the lower court. 99 S. Ct. at
2528.
64. At least one commentator has traced the progress of juvenile rights to the
civil rights movement of the early 1960's and other egalitarian trends in the second
half of this century. Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some
Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 605,
606-07.
65. 99 S. Ct. at 2505.
66. 99 S. Ct. at 2519 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). In an opinion in which
Justices Marshall and Stevens joined, Justice Brennan pointed out that the case is
governed by the rule of Danforth. Certainly the right to freedom from unnecessary
incarceration in a mental institution is at least as important a liberty interest as the
right to obtain an abortion protected in Danforth. Furthermore, he noted that in the
instant case, unlike Danforth, the child had been ousted from his family. Under such
circumstances, he argued, children have an even greater need for an independent advo-
cate. Id.
67. See text at notes 34-40, supra.
NO TES
represented in J.R. and Institutionalized Juveniles, these recent
decisions reveal an unwillingness to depart from more firmly
established rights of family autonomy and a belief that, in cases of
immature and/or incompetent children, their most fundamental right
is protection from their own poor judgment. 8 Traditionally, the
family has functioned as the guardian of its individual members, par-
ticularly those incapable of protecting their own interests. Relative
to these children, the traditional family role continues to receive
maximum constitutional protection and the support of a majority of
the Court.
Theresa Gallion
Ambach v. Norwick: A FURTHER RETREAT FROM Graham
Two permanent-resident alien1 school teachers' instituted an ac-
tion to contest the constitutionality of a New York statute' pro-
68. For expansion on this proposition, see Hafen, supra note 64, at 651-52.
1. "The term 'alien' means any person not a citizen or national of the United
States." Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (1976). An
alien who has been granted the privilege of residing permanently in the United States
as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws is said to have been "lawful-
ly admitted for permanent residence." See id. §§ 101(a)(15), 101(a)(20) & 245, 8 U.S.C. §§
1101(a)(15), 1101(a)(20) & 1255 (1976). For an outline of the regulations pertaining to ad-
justing one's status from that of a nonimmigrant to that of a person admitted for per-
manent residence, see E. RUBIN, IMMIGRATION PRACTICE A87-A92 (1978).
This note is limited primarily to a discussion of discrimination against resident
aliens.
2. The original plaintiff, S. Norwick, was born in Scotland and is a British sub-
ject. T. Dachinger, who obtained leave to intervene as a plaintiff, was born in Finland
and remains a citizen of that country. The plaintiffs' applications for teaching cer-
tificates were denied because of their failure to meet the citizenship requirements of
section 3001(3) of the New York Education Law. Ambach v. Norwick, 99 S. Ct. 1589,
1591-92 (1979). For the text of section 3001(3), see note 3, infra.
3. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3001(3) (McKinney 1967). Section 3001(3) provides in perti-
nent part:
No person shall be employed or authorized to teach in the public schools of the
state who is: ... (3) Not a citizen. The provisions of this subdivision shall not ap-
ply, however, to an alien teacher now or hereafter employed, provided such
teacher shall make due application to become a citizen and thereafter within the
time prescribed by law shall become a citizen.
This statute provides that temporary permits can be issued for persons who are in-
eligible for citizenship because of oversubscribed quotas. The Commissioner of Educa-
tion can and has provided for temporary certificates for aliens who are not yet eligible
for citizenship. 99 S. Ct. at 1591 n.2.
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